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
Multilateralism, a More Effective Operational Approach to Asia-Pacific Security.

By

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract of

MULTILATERALISM, A MORE EFFICIENT OPERATIONAL APPROACH TO
ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY

United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) has the mission to enhance security and promote peaceful development in the Asia-Pacific region by deterring aggression, responding to crises, and being ready to fight to win both today and in the future. USPACOM's emphasis is on military activities that assist in building coalitions and shaping the international environment to protect and promote U.S. interests. USPACOM accomplishes this mission primarily through bilateral security relationships with nations in and around the USPACOM area of responsibility. This paper uses the operational factors of space, forces, and time to assess whether a multilateral rather than a bilateral approach would benefit USPACOM's mission accomplishment. Possible multilateral activities/operations were derived from threat analysis and the USPACOM Theater Engagement Plan. Bilateral and multilateral aspects of these activities/operations were then compared using operational factor elements from all three operational factors, space, forces and time. The analysis shows that while there are opportunities to improve USPACOM interoperability through increased multilateral interaction in search and rescue, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations, bilateral interaction should remain USPACOM's primary means of mission accomplishment.

INTRODUCTION

United States National Security Strategy for a New Century notes that "our military presence has been essential to maintaining the stability that has enabled most nations in the Asia-Pacific region to build thriving economies for the benefit of all." ¹ Derived from this, our national security strategy objectives include strengthening the U.S.-Japan/U.S.-Australia alliances, expanding security cooperation and access in Southeast Asia, working with South Korea and China to engage North Korea, building a long-term relationship with China through comprehensive engagement, developing regional transparency and confidence building measures (CBMs), and focusing attention on the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat. ² The primary agent executing this security strategy is the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM).

USPACOM's mission is to enhance security and promote peaceful development in the Asia-Pacific region by deterring aggression, responding to crises, and being ready to fight to win both today and in the future. ³ USPACOM's strategy to accomplish this mission spans the conflict spectrum from peace through crisis response to actual conflict, and is focused on preventive defense. USPACOM's emphasis is on military activities that assist in building coalitions and shaping the international environment to protect and promote U.S. interests. USPACOM's strategy and emphasis are based on key strategic and operational factors affecting USPACOM's area of responsibility (AOR).

USPACOM's AOR contains over 40 nations with 60% of the world's population, and six of the world's largest armies. Five of the world's seven nuclear weapons powers are located in the Pacific region, and all seven have interests there. Currently, 18 nations have ongoing border, resource or maritime disputes, and many of these have a violent history such as in the Spratly Islands and between North and South Korea, India-China, India-Pakistan, China-Vietnam, and China-Taiwan to name just a few. These are just the international disputes, and do not take into

account any of the internal problems faced by Asia-Pacific nations that affect internal stability and that can also fuel international conflict. Unlike the European theater, where the U.S. has the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for collective security and as a basis for political and military-to-military relations, the U.S. has no military collective security agreements in the Pacific theater. The purpose of this paper is to assess USPACOM security activities/operations from an operational perspective to determine if a multilateral rather than bilateral approach would benefit USPACOM's mission accomplishment.

Intuitively, a multilateral approach to Asia-Pacific security seems appropriate. The United States successfully used NATO for almost half a century to contain the former Soviet Union. More recently, NATO provided the basis for peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and humanitarian intervention forces in Kosovo. While there were undoubtedly rough spots in bringing 19 countries together to conduct military operations, NATO standing operating procedures (SOPs), standardized information operations procedures and equipment, and operational familiarity gained through NATO exercises enabled the forces to respond more rapidly and effectively on both the operational and tactical level than without NATO.⁴ So why isn't there a NATO in the Pacific theater?

Collective security organizations have been tried in the Pacific theater. The Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Mutual Security Pact, was signed in 1951 as a defense against a resurgent Japan. This trilateral security arrangement matured into an instrument to contain communism, but New Zealand's 1984 anti-nuclear policy forced the U.S. to terminate its treaty obligations with New Zealand in August 1986.⁵ Currently, ANZUS is essentially a double bilateral Australia-U.S. and Australia-New Zealand arrangement. Likewise, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact) established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 to contain the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. While the Manila Pact still forms the basis of U.S.-Thai and U.S.-Philippine security relations, SEATO dissolved in 1976 because it could not

meet the primary security threat in Southeast Asia, insurgency.⁶ The only other Pacific theater collective security arrangement, the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) between Commonwealth members Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Malaysia, and Singapore, appears to be moving ahead again after a two-year hiatus in Malaysian cooperation. Established in 1971 to defend Malaysia and Singapore from possible Indonesian aggression, the FPDA has had problems similar to SEATO and ANZUS throughout its tenure.⁷

Given the less than stellar performance of Pacific theater collective defense arrangements, the question is what contributes most to USPACOM's operational capabilities to accomplish its strategic mission, continued bilateralism or multilateralism in military-to-military relations? This question can be analyzed by examining the security threats identified by USPACOM, determining what operations would likely be conducted to counter those threats and then comparing bilateral relationship with potential multilateral relationship contributions. Operational factors of space, time and forces would be used in categorizing and comparing relationship benefits.

As noted above, collective defense arrangements and the multilateral military-to-military relationships they establish have not done well in the Pacific theater. However, NATO's success in improving the organization's interoperability has important implications for USPACOM and the Pacific theater. If crafted skillfully to avoid or minimize potential cooperation stoppers, collective defense arrangements should improve Pacific theater multilateral military-to-military relationships and contribute more to USPACOM's mission accomplishment in terms of space, time and forces than relying primarily on bilateral security relationships.

USPACOM SECURITY THREATS

The USPACOM AOR is divided into four regions: Northeast Asia (China, Japan, Mongolia, North and South Korea, Taiwan, and Russia); Southeast Asia (Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam); South Asia

(principally Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Indian Ocean island nations); and Oceania (principally Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and the Pacific Island nations).⁸ Militarily, Northeast Asia contains the greatest security threats. North Korea threatens not only South Korea and the 37,000 U.S. soldiers stationed there, but also threatens Japan and other friendly nations because of North Korea's WMD capability. China's claims to Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, the Paracel Islands, and the South China Sea region pose a threat to Taiwan, Japan, and many of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members. Japan disputes ownership of the Liancourt Rocks with South Korea and the Kurile Islands with Russia, which also adds tension to the region.

As noted above, the Southeast Asian nations of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and to a lesser extent, Indonesia, dispute China's claim to the Spratly Islands and resources in the South China Sea. This dispute has already led to small-scale confrontations and occasional gunfire exchanges between China and other claimants as well as between some Southeast Asian nations themselves.⁹ While this dispute has perhaps the greatest potential to involve the U.S. in a major confrontation with China, piracy, ongoing insurgencies and ethnic conflict, border disputes, and drug trafficking all have an adverse effect on regional stability.

South Asia also contains some significant security threats. Both India and Pakistan detonated nuclear test devices in May 1998, ending any speculation that they were indeed nuclear weapon states. In addition to testing nuclear weapons, both countries have developed or acquired missiles capable of WMD delivery. They have already fought three wars over the disputed areas of Jammu and Kashmir, and fire upon each other almost daily along the line of control separating India and Pakistan in the disputed areas. India-China relations are also poor. China reportedly assisted Pakistan in developing its nuclear weapon and missile capabilities, and also has an ongoing border dispute with India along the Siachen Glacier. India cited China's nuclear capability as one of the

reasons for detonating its nuclear devices and for developing the Agni-II ballistic missile that can reach Beijing.¹⁰ India and China see each others naval expansion programs as possible threats in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea respectively. Finally, Sri Lanka's battle against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has not gone well. Despite help from U.S. Special Forces in a Joint and Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program, Sri Lankan forces have been defeated repeatedly in northern Sri Lanka. LTTE forces, on the other hand, have improved their capabilities and India is suspected of having provided both training and weapons to the LTTE.¹¹

Oceania is the most "pacific" region of the USPACOM AOR, but it still has its share of security threats. Papua New Guinea is potentially the wealthiest nation in Oceania, but it is also the least stable. The Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) continues to fight against the Papua New Guinea Defense Force (PNGDF), and the PNGDF and federal government are unable to exert much control over Bougainville or many other parts of Papua New Guinea. Ethnic, political, and religious conflicts are ongoing in the Solomon Islands, Fiji, New Caledonia, Vanuatu, and French Polynesia. Drug trafficking, and other forms of transnational crime, natural disasters, and the inability of most of these nations to control their maritime resource areas all affect regional stability.

POTENTIAL USPACOM OPERATIONS

USPACOM's mission requires the command be operationally ready to respond across the conflict spectrum. USPACOM's Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) is a progression of activities that follow the conflict spectrum from peacetime through crisis response to major theater war.

USPACOM's Commander in Chief (USCINCPAC), Admiral Blair, spells out his priorities in his TEP intent:

The foundation of our engagement plan is credible forward presence backed by capable forces prepared to respond to crises and, if necessary, fight and win a major theater war. During peacetime, our military forces will reinforce strong bilateral relationships with allies and friends and promote emerging multilateral activities and dialogues....By increasing our interoperability with friends and allies and preparing our own military skills during peacetime, we become more effective during crisis management or combat.¹²

Peacetime operations help shape the overall security environment by demonstrating U.S. regional commitment, improving interoperability with friends and allies, reducing or eliminating sources of instability, and deterring aggression. Peace operations (peacekeeping), counter-drug operations, search and rescue (SAR) operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, military civic action (MCA), and defense cooperation in armaments (DCA) are all peacetime military activities that contribute to shaping the security environment and preparing USPACOM allied and friendly forces for other contingencies.

Crisis response activities focus on resolving situations prior to actual conflict erupting, which could require U.S. military involvement in combat operations. Operations at this point on the conflict spectrum include noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), peace enforcement, exclusion zone enforcement, sanctions and maritime intercept operations, and counter-terrorism. While some of these operations have unique features, most of them build on activities and operations routinely conducted during peacetime, and virtually all of them would require some form of military-to-military cooperation with Pacific theater friends and allies to be politically, economically and militarily effective.

Finally, USPACOM has to be ready to respond to a possible major theater war on the Korean peninsula or other major contingencies involving regional powers such as China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Japan, South Korea or Taiwan. These contingencies would probably require major joint force deployments to counter aggressive threats to our friends and allies (South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan), to intercede between friends and allies in territorial disputes (South Korea-Japan, Taiwan-Japan, or Taiwan-Philippines), or to intercede between regional powers (India-Pakistan, China-India, or India-Sri Lanka). In 1953, the United Nations Command (UNC) in Korea consisted of 17 countries and fielded nearly one million soldiers to combat North Korean and Chinese forces, but today the U.S. and South Korea are UNC's only members. A major theater war contingency in

Korea would undoubtedly involve Japanese support, and probably involve other U.S. friends and allies as it did in 1953.¹³ Similarly, for political, economic and military reasons, the U.S. would undoubtedly attempt to establish a coalition to deal with any of the other possible major contingencies in the Pacific theater.

USCINCPAC's TEP intent recognizes that building effective coalitions is key to USPACOM's strategic and operational success, and the key to successful coalitions is interoperability. The optimum solution would be to establish NATO-like collective security organizations to meet regional security threats rather than form ad hoc coalitions to respond to crises. Like NATO, these organizations could establish operational and tactical SOPs, standardization agreements for military materiel, and focus multilateral exercises on probable contingency operations. Unfortunately, as Asia-Pacific history has demonstrated, there is no USPACOM AOR threat strong enough to support such an organization. In this security environment, USPACOM's challenge is to improve interoperability with friends and allies in the absence of a unifying threat or established coalition framework.

To date, USPACOM has met this challenge primarily through bilateral military-to-military relationships. This does not mean that there are no multilateral military-to-military events in the USPACOM AOR. CJCS and USPACOM sponsor many multilateral fora like the Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS), Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS), and the Military Operations and Law Conference. However, PAMS, PASOLS, and other seminars and conferences support interoperability through developing a general understanding of USPACOM AOR issues and military forces, not by establishing operational frameworks or agreements.¹⁴ More importantly, only 11 out of 123 USPACOM exercises are multilateral, and six of those are with U.S. forces and just two other countries. USPACOM's largest exercise, COBRA GOLD, is a CJCS-sponsored, bilateral exercise with Thailand. There are no multilateral exercises specifically focused

on meeting USPACOM's greatest potential threat, war in Korea.¹⁵ If Asia-Pacific nations' national interests and threat perceptions preclude multilateral exercises focused on a recognized threat like North Korea, then perhaps multilateral exercises with a focus on broader regional issues would be more palatable politically, but still contribute to increased interoperability.

USCINCPAC's TEP groups activities with other nations in three general categories: preventive defense, crisis response for smaller-scale contingencies, and major theater war.¹⁶ Since exercises focused on major theater war or other major contingencies are politically out of reach for now, the other two categories should be analyzed for potential multi-lateral activities to improve interoperability. The first category, preventive defense activities, has the largest number of potential multilateral activities that could improve interoperability and operational effectiveness. Counter-drug (C-D), peace operations (PKO), SAR, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), MCA, counter-terrorism (C-T), and DCA are all activities currently conducted with USPACOM AOR nations, but mostly on a bilateral basis. SAR and HA/DR are the only two activities that have been exercised multilaterally.¹⁷ Preventive defense activities all contribute to regional stability; comparison by operational factors of space, time and forces in the following sections will determine if these activities would be more operationally beneficial as bilateral or multilateral activities.

There are fewer activities in the second category, crisis responses to smaller-scale contingencies. These include NEO, peace enforcement (PE), exclusion zone enforcement (EZE), and maritime intercept operations (MAR INT). This category has fewer activities listed because of the difference in Asia-Pacific nation's armed forces and their capabilities as well as political considerations. As with the first category, USPACOM already conducts or exercises these activities, but they are all done on a bilateral basis. These crisis response activities will also be compared by operational factors in the following sections to determine if they would contribute

more to USPACOM's operational and strategic success as multilateral activities than as bilateral activities.

OPERATIONAL FACTOR COMPARISON – GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS

Analyzing USPACOM TEP activities in terms of operational factors space, time, and forces, requires some qualifying assumptions. First, in broad terms, USPACOM has two TEP courses of actions (COAs) available. The first COA is to continue its primarily bilateral security approach to TEP activities. The second COA is to adopt a multilateral approach to TEP activities. The obvious third COA is to adopt a mix of both, which is currently the case. However, for purely analytical purposes, a distinction must be made between bilateral and multilateral interaction to make a distinction between the two possibilities for a specific activity/operation.

Second, rather than look at the possibility of conducting a USPACOM activity/operation across the entire AOR, potential activities/operations will be analyzed by region. A primary reason there is no NATO-like security organization and multilateral relationships in the Asia-Pacific region is the diversity of national interests across such an immense AOR. USPACOM divides its AOR into regions because regional interests are generally more influential politically, economically, and militarily in a specific region than non-regional issues. Therefore, it is easier to tailor activities/operations by region rather than attempting to establish them AOR-wide.

Third, USPACOM activities/operations are not appropriate for some regions. A good example of this is in Oceania. Not all Pacific Island nations even have armed forces. Many nations have constabulary forces only, with specialized paramilitary elements for maritime security; Australia and New Zealand are the only Pacific Island nations with an air force.¹⁸ Most of these countries are incapable of participating in many USPACOM activities on even a bilateral basis, let alone a multilateral basis. Australia has been unsuccessful in attempting to establish joint EEZ patrolling with Pacific Island nations because of their extremely limited maritime assets, the long

distances involved, and small budgets for even an important security and economic issue as this. Operational factor analysis for USPACOM activities/operations is therefore limited to Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia regions.

Finally, not all operational factor elements apply for each activity/operation and should not be used to evaluate the activity's contribution as a possible bilateral or multilateral activity. This is consistent with Joint Military Operations Department guidance on analyzing operational factors, "analyze only those aspects of factors space, time and forces that are applicable to the mission of your own forces." ¹⁹

The tables at the end of this paper illustrate the operational factor comparison by region. Table 1 covers Northeast Asia, Table 2 covers Southeast Asia, and Table 3 covers South Asia. The tables list the operational factor elements considered along the left margin with the activity/operation the factor applies to across the top. Boxes labeled "B" for bilateral and "M" for multilateral indicate whether the operational factor analysis favors bilateral or multilateral interaction. Operational factor definitions are located at the end of the paper following the tables.

OPERATIONAL FACTOR COMPARISON – NORTHEAST ASIA

Table 1 illustrates the comparison of operational factors by activity/operation in Northeast Asia. C-D and MCA operations have been eliminated because C-D operations are primarily carried out using civilian authorities, and the Northeast Asian nations are considered developed nations, not developing nations where MCA projects are usually conducted. Natural resources have also been eliminated as an operational factor (space) for comparison because they would not have an impact on the bilateral or multilateral nature of operations.

On comparison, most operational factors favor multilateral interaction over bilateral interaction. The region's size, level of economic, political, and military development make multilateral interaction more efficient operationally. Each nation has an advanced level of science

and technology, developed communications and transportation systems, and military logistics systems capable of adapting to support virtually any type of security activity/operation required. Interoperability problems could arise because each country has developed unique elements within its military and civilian infrastructure, but multilateral activities/operations like peace operations, SAR, HA/DR and NEO exercises could be used as vehicles to help standardize equipment and procedures needed for improved interoperability and more efficient operations. In the short run, time could be considered a negative factor in missions requiring a quick response like SAR and NEO, but once a multilateral operational framework is established, multilateral operations in these areas could probably be conducted faster and more effectively than bilateral operations. Given this perspective, there are no instances in SAR and NEO activities/operations where bilateral interaction provides more benefit than multilateral interaction.

PKO and C-T operations are the next most promising area for multilateral interaction. Demographic factors and nationalism/cultural factors have a strong influence on whether these activities are bilateral or multilateral. Japan's history of aggression in Asia makes Japanese military participation in regional PKO a sensitive proposition. Japan's first involvement in peacekeeping was in Cambodia in 1992, when Japanese observers were included in UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) forces. While Japanese peacekeeping forces would probably be difficult to introduce in Korea, China, Russia or Southeast Asia, Japanese logistical and technical support for such operations could prove invaluable. Japanese technical and logistical support for C-T activities could also prove invaluable in establishing multilateral activities/operations to combat terrorism. Demographics and nationalism/cultural factors also influence this type activity because of the large variety of ethnic, cultural, and religious groups in Northeast Asia. C-T activities are often easier to conduct bilaterally because of sensitivities involved in targeting specific groups with transnational ethnic, cultural or religious ties. With all other factors favoring multilateral interaction, PKO and

AT/CT activities/operations are clearly two areas with potential for greater benefit through multilateral interaction.

HA/DR operations are another area of potential benefit through multilateral interaction. Northeast Asia suffers from a variety of natural disasters like earthquakes, typhoons, and floods every year. Bilateral aid is the norm, but this is often an inefficient means of providing aid, and requires the host nation to coordinate with a potentially large number of donors to elicit the type response actually needed. A multilateral approach to HA/DR operations could be tailored to meet a variety of situations that frequently occur by establishing a regional response cell with visibility on the assets that regional members could provide to respond. Unfortunately, internal political considerations, diplomatic considerations, and nationalism/cultural considerations often influence the shape assistance takes following a natural or manmade disaster. Taiwan severely criticized China for interfering with international aid for political and diplomatic reasons, and refused to allow Chinese rescue teams, seismologists or supplies to enter Taiwan.²⁰ The Taiwan-China split in this area is probably the most difficult hurdle for multilateral activities/operations to overcome; Japan provided the largest disaster relief contingent and was welcomed by Taiwan, a former colony of Japan.

DCA, PE, EZE and MAR INT operations would be the hardest to conduct multilaterally. Bilateral interaction is more beneficial given the current influence of political, diplomatic, economic and nationalist/cultural elements of the operational factor, space. Arms sales are an important economic sector of not only Northeast Asian countries, but the U.S. as well. With the exception of direct purchases of U.S. weapon systems, or bilateral production agreements for specific weapon systems, armaments cooperation is limited to low-level areas as the result. Armaments cooperation is also limited by strict U.S. end-user laws. PE, EZE, and MAR INT operations can be exercised bilaterally with less influence by demographic, political, diplomatic, and nationalism/cultural

elements than can multilateral activities/operations. Every Northeast Asian country has at least one boundary dispute with another Northeast Asian country, which makes cooperation in these types of operations sensitive to perceptions of who the operation is directed against. These type operations virtually require a threat level that would make a collective security agreement viable before they can be exercised multilaterally.

OPERATIONAL FACTOR COMPARISON – SOUTHEAST ASIA

Table 2 illustrates the comparison of operational factors by activity/operation in Southeast Asia. C-D and MCA activities/operations are included in this table, and USPACOM conducts more C-D and MCA bilateral activities/operations in this region than in any other. Natural resources have also been considered as an operational factor element (space) for comparison because they could have an impact on the bilateral or multilateral nature of operations. Science and technology as been eliminated as an operational factor element (space) because it probably would not have an impact on the bilateral or multilateral nature of operations.

Similar to Northeast Asia, most operational factors favor multilateral interaction over bilateral interaction. The region's size relative to the size of most Southeast Asian nations, level of economic, political, and military development make multilateral interaction more efficient operationally. Since the end of the Cold War, and more abruptly since the Asian economic crisis of 1997, military budgets throughout Southeast Asia have declined. Malaysia stopped all military procurement for two years, Thailand was released from a U.S. agreement to purchase F-18s and the U.S. donated seven jet engines so Thai AV-8S Harriers could improve their operational ready rate of two out of nine aircraft available for flight operations.²¹ In this restrained economic environment, conducting multiple bilateral activities/operations becomes economically unfeasible, whereas conducting one multilateral activity which brings together multiple regional nations is more cost effective for the U.S. and for them.

PKO, SAR, and HA/DR operations have the greatest potential for multilateralism.

Demographically, this region has more ethnic, religious, and linguistic variations than most other regions. Papua New Guinea, which borders Irian Jaya, Indonesia, has more than 900 separate languages which are used to determine personal and cultural relationships. However, peace operations in Cambodia in 1991-93 included peacekeepers from every Southeast Asian nation except Burma, Vietnam and Laos. Currently, the Philippines has taken command of UN peacekeeping operations in East Timor, with the U.S. in a supporting role. This experience could be used as a basis for forming a regional peace operations arrangement. Since the U.S. already conducts SAR exercises with Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia on a bilateral basis, the next step should incorporate that bilateral experience in a multilateral exercise to promote a more effective regional capability. Similarly, the U.S. could use its Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) program as the basis for expanded HA/DR multilateral activities. CARAT currently provides medical assistance to Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines on a bilateral basis during ship visits.²² The Thai aircraft carrier, HMTS Chakri Naruebet, hull number 911, was originally proposed as a HA/DR platform for Thailand, but could be used regionally similar to CARAT exercises if adequate funding was provided.²³

A related activity that has potential as a multilateral activity/operation is military civic action. The U.S. usually conducts MCA operations as part of a bilateral exercise, or as a means of exercising reserve units with a CAPSTONE mission in the USPACOM AOR. The primary problems that make bilateral activities more beneficial are the geography, lack of robust transportation and communications systems in the rural areas that usually require civic action projects, and the nationalism/cultural attitudes that sometimes arise if the two countries border each other. Thai engineers built roads in northwestern Cambodia to help the UN peacekeeping mission in 1992, and worked closely with Malaysian engineers in doing so. Cambodians welcomed both

these countries' efforts to help them. However, Thai would have a difficult time doing the same thing in Burma because of old animosities. Similar situations exist between Vietnam and Cambodia, Singapore and Malaysia, and the Philippines and Malaysia. However, in other areas, multilateral MCA projects could be beneficial by capitalizing on the relative strengths of the Southeast Asian nations in working together to build a stronger region. The ASEAN Regional Forum could be used to develop the MCA programs and prioritize them for execution. The project itself would be a good CBM; interoperability gained could be beneficial in other security-related operations.

NEO and PE operations are two other activities/operations that could be more beneficial as multilateral activities than as bilateral activities. However, the political, diplomatic, and nationalism/cultural elements of operational factor space virtually preclude these activities from becoming multilateral. All ASEAN members have signed and ratified both the ASEAN Declaration (1967, Bangkok) and the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Declaration (1971, Kuala Lumpur) which declare that member states will refrain from interfering in each others internal affairs and also limit the extent that external powers can influence member states.²⁴ While these agreements allow peaceful interventions under the auspices of the UN, force or the potential use of force is not authorized. This puts C-D, DCA, C-T, NEO, PE, EZE, and MAR INT type operations outside the scope of possible multilateral interaction until a major threat to ASEAN security develops that allows the member nations to modify their security interactions with themselves and outside powers.

OPERATIONAL FACTOR COMPARISON – SOUTH ASIA

Table 3 illustrates the comparison of operational factors by activity/operation in South Asia. This table is similar to Table 2, but includes science and technology as an element of operational factor space because of the advanced level of military technology enjoyed by India and Pakistan,

two key regional nations. Natural resources have also been considered as an operational factor element (space) for comparison because resources could have an impact on the bilateral or multilateral nature of operations.

South Asia is almost a cross between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia when comparing operational factors. South Asia has a wide variety of militarily significant geography to consider as well as widely varying demographics, economies, political and diplomatic traditions, and nationalism/cultural orientations. Size ranges from India, a subcontinent in itself, to the tiny Indian Ocean island nations. India is a maritime nation; Nepal and Bhutan are landlocked. India was a leader of the non-aligned movement; Pakistan was a SEATO member. India's economy is one of the world's largest, but has some of the poorest areas in the world. However, even with this variation, there are many areas where multilateral interaction could be beneficial. With the exception of the Indian Ocean island nations, the South Asian nations enjoy a common military tradition, which stems from the British. Military formations in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh are organized along British lines, and this makes military-to-military cooperation easier. The large area, susceptibility to natural disasters, and limited economic resources that can be devoted security make multilateral activities/operations for HA/DR, PKO, and SAR operations most beneficial. The only consideration that favors bilateral interaction in these types of activities/operations is the ethnic, religious, and linguistic divisions that exist throughout the region. However, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh frequently participate in UN peacekeeping missions where they must work together on a daily basis. This PKO experience could be used as the basis for developing multilateral PKO exercises and training that could improve regional stability and overall interoperability.

Unlike Southeast Asia, there seems little likelihood that multilateral MCA projects would be possible. Diplomatic and political problems that exist between India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri

Lanka make such cooperation virtually impossible. South Asian economies are not able to provide for internal nation-building requirements, let alone provide for cooperation with diplomatically unfriendly neighbors.

Multilateral cooperation in other activities/operations is also very unlikely given the existing operational factors. C-D, C-T, DCA, NEO, PE, EZE, and MAR INT activities/operations could be beneficial multilaterally from a forces and time perspective. However, the space operational factors (demographics, politics, diplomacy, and nationalism/culture) override the other factors and in some cases make even bilateral activities impossible.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of the foregoing analysis was to assess USPACOM security activities/operations from an operational perspective to determine if a multilateral rather than bilateral approach would benefit USPACOM's mission accomplishment. For the regions assessed, Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia, the answer is that bilateral interaction is still the most appropriate form for most USPACOM activities/operations. This is especially true for most crisis-response-to-smaller-contingency type activities. Demographic, political, diplomatic and nationalism/cultural operational factor elements do not support multilateral activities without a significant change in the current security situation. However, this analysis also shows that there are probably opportunities for increased multilateral interaction at the peacetime end of the conflict spectrum.

For Northeast Asia, multilateral SAR, NEO, PKO, C-T, and HA/DR activities are possible given the right circumstances, and those activities could be used to improve USPACOM interoperability. Ongoing bilateral SAR exercises with Russia, Japan, and South Korea could possibly be expanded to a multilateral exercise with the right venue and scenario. Operational factors also support NEO and C-T exercises as multilateral activities/operations as long as the

scenario does not offend regional diplomatic/political/nationalist/cultural sensibilities. Japan's aggressive history and the China-Taiwan problem are the two greatest stumbling blocks to using multilateral activities/operations to improve overall regional security and interoperability with USPACOM forces.

The Southeast and South Asian regions also present opportunities to increase USPACOM interoperability through multilateral activities/operations. In both regions, PKO, SAR, and HA/DR multilateral activities/operations appear to be supported by the operational factors space, forces and time. Current PKO in East Timor demonstrate that these operations can be done. USPACOM's challenge is to build on this experience by institutionalizing this multilateral cooperation in an appropriate format to build transparency and confidence into regional interaction, thereby improving regional security and interoperability.

Unfortunately, the analysis also shows that demographic/political/diplomatic/nationalist elements of the operational factor, space, outweigh other elements of space, forces, and time that support additional multilateral interaction. For this reason, operational factor analysis does not support multilateral C-D, DCA, NEO, C-T, PE, EZE, or MAR INT activities/operations; bilateral interaction with USPACOM forces is still the most beneficial means of achieving USPACOM's TEP intent of providing security through engagement.

Given these conclusions, I recommend that USPACOM develop scenarios to expand current bilateral SAR activities in all three regions to make them into multilateral activities. Success in this area could be used as a regional CBM and the basis for expanding regional PKO and HA/DR bilateral activities into multilateral activities. Step-by-step expansion of regional multilateral interaction improves regional stability, but also improves USPACOM interoperability with regional forces and throughout the AOR.

Table 1

NORTHEAST ASIA OPERATIONAL FACTORS

ACTIVITY/ OPERATION	PKO		SAR		HA/ DR		C-T		DCA		NEO		PE		EZE		MAR INT	
	B	M	B	M	B	M	B	M	B	M	B	M	B	M	B	M	B	M
INTERACTION																		
FACTOR																		
Military Geography		X		X		X		X	-	-		X		X		X		X
Demographics	X		-	-		X	X		-	-		X	X		X		X	
Politics		X		X	X			X	X			X	X		X		X	
Diplomacy		X		X	X			X	X			X	X		X		X	
Economy		X		X		X		X	X			X		X		X		X
Transportation Systems		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X
Communication Systems		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X
Nationalism/ Culture	X			X	X		X		X			X	X		X		X	
Science & Technology		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X
Defense System		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X
Armed Forces		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X
Relative Combat Power		X		X		X		X	-	-		X		X		X		X
Logistics		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X
Time		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X

Table 2

SOUTHEAST ASIA OPERATIONAL FACTORS

ACTIVITY/ OPERATION	C-D		PKO		SAR		HA/ DR		MCA		C-T		DCA		NEO		PE		EZE		MAR INT	
INTERACTION	B	M	B	M	B	M	B	M	B	M	B	M	B	M	B	M	B	M	B	M	B	M
FACTOR																						
Military Geography		X		X		X		X	X		X		-	-		X		X	X		X	
Demographics	X			X		X		X		X	X		-	-		X		X		X		X
Politics	X			X		X		X		X	X		X		X		X		X		X	
Diplomacy	X			X		X		X		X	X		X		X		X		X		X	
Natural Resources		X		X	-	-		X		X	X		X	-	-		X	X		X		
Economy		X		X		X		X		X		X	X			X		X		X		X
Transportation Systems		X		X		X		X	X			X	X			X		X		X		X
Communication Systems		X		X		X		X	X			X	X			X		X		X		X
Nationalism/Culture	X			X		X		X	X		X		X		X		X		X		X	
Defense System		X		X		X		X		X		X	X			X		X		X		X
Armed Forces		X		X		X		X		X		X	X			X		X		X		X
Relative Combat Power		X		X		X		X		X		X	-	-		X		X		X		X
Logistics		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X
Time		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X

Table 3

SOUTH ASIA OPERATIONAL FACTORS

ACTIVITY/ OPERATION	C-D		PKO		SAR		HA/ DR		MCA		C-T		DCA		NEO		PE		EZE		MAR INT	
INTERACTION FACTOR	B	M	B	M	B	M	B	M	B	M	B	M	B	M	B	M	B	M	B	M	B	M
Military Geography		X		X		X		X	X			X	-	-		X		X		X		X
Demographics	X		X			X		X		X	X		-	-	X		X		X		X	
Politics	X			X		X		X	X		X		X		X		X		X		X	
Diplomacy	X			X		X		X	X		X		X		X		X		X		X	
Natural Resources	X			X	-	-		X		X		X		X	-	-		X	X		X	
Economy	X			X		X		X	X			X	X			X		X		X		X
Transportation Systems		X		X		X		X	X			X	X			X		X		X		X
Communications Systems		X		X		X		X	X			X	X			X		X		X		X
Nationalism/ Culture	X			X		X		X	X		X		X		X		X		X		X	
Science & Technology		X		X		X		X		X		X	X			X		X		X		X
Defense System		X		X		X		X		X		X	X			X		X		X		X
Armed Forces		X		X		X		X		X		X	X			X		X		X		X
Relative Combat Power		X		X		X		X		X		X	-	-		X		X		X		X
Logistics		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X
Time		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X

OPERATIONAL FACTOR DEFINITIONS

1. Space:

a. Military geography. This element includes general aspects of the physical environment including the relative size of the area or region, national positions within the region and the region within the AOR, relative and actual distances from militarily significant points, relevant oceanographic/hydrographic information, and military significant weather.

b. Demographics. This element includes militarily significant aspects of the regional population including ethnic composition, religious composition, linguistic groups, age groups as it affects military-age personnel, and health and medical information.

c. Politics. This element includes military significant aspects of the regional political systems including respect for human rights, rule of law, political stability, significant political groupings, and political support for U.S. interests.

d. Diplomacy. This element includes political support for U.S. interests, significant regional diplomatic coalitions/arrangements/treaties, and past and present international disputes.

e. Transportation systems. This element includes strategic and operational aspects of the nation's transportation system and focuses on the ability to support military operations/cooperation with other nations.

f. Communication systems. This element includes strategic and operational aspects of the nation's transportation system and focuses on the ability to support military operations/cooperation with other nations.

g. Nationalism/culture. This element includes militarily significant aspects of the nation's sense of itself e.g. a focused, unified nation with a sense of purpose, or loosely held groups with different interests and ideas about the national identity.

h. Science and technology. This element includes military significant achievements such as indigenous conventional and WMD programs, and the ability to adapt external military technologies quickly.

i. Economy. This element includes the overall ability of the nation to support itself, its military establishment and security requirements, and provide personal security for its population.

j. Natural resources. This element includes the status of military significant resources and the nation's ability to obtain the resources required to provide for its security during crisis situations.

2. Forces:

a. Defense system. This element includes a long-term perspective of the national and regional defense system, coalition/alliance relationships, legitimacy of the system, arms acquisition patterns, and overall competence in providing national security.

b. Armed forces. This element includes order of battle information on all relevant security services, doctrine, training, and mobilization patterns.

c. Relative combat power. This element includes an estimate of the national and regional ability to bring forces to bear to accomplish a specific mission.

d. Logistics. This element includes an estimate of the national and regional ability to support forces allocated to accomplish a specific mission.

3. Time. This element includes a generic assessment of the time required for planning, preparing, and executing an operation in conjunction with operational factors of space and forces.

NOTES

¹ President, Proclamation, "A National Security Strategy for a New Century," (October 1998), 41.

² "The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region 1998," DefenseLINK Publications, 23 November 1998, <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/easrp8/> (23 April 2000).

³ "About U.S. Pacific Command," United States Pacific Command Homepage, <http://www.pacom.mil/about/strategy/> (20 April 2000).

⁴ "NATO Standardization Agreements," NATO On-line Library, 23 March 2000, <http://www.nato.int/docu/standard.htm> (27 April 2000). NATO Standardization Agreements alone cover everything from clothing acceptance standards to standardizing the electronic formats, data links, and equipment for aerial surveillance photos. This level of standardization helps interoperability greatly, which has a positive impact on the operational factor of time required to prepare for and conduct operations.

⁵ "Secret Power: New Zealand's Role in the International Spy Network," Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/sp/sp_c1.htm (15 April 2000). Nicky Hager's book describes in detail Prime Minister David Lange's decision to deny USS Buchanan's port call on 27 February 1985. After months of trying to persuade Lange to take a different approach in applying his Labour Party's anti-nuclear policy, the U.S. put New Zealand active ANZUS participation in abeyance in August 1986.

⁶ Leszek Buszynski, "S.E.A.T.O.: The Failure of an Alliance Strategy" (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983). Buszynski argues that SEATO was flawed at its inception because as a collective defense treaty, its focus was entirely external. While this protected the signatories from attack from an external source (Pakistan joined to forestall an attack by India), it could not address insurgency.

⁷ "Five-Power Defence Pact Back on Track," The Straits Times Interactive, 16 March 2000, <http://www.straitstimes.asia1.com/singapore/sin110315.html> and "Malaysia's U-Turn," Janes Information Group, 24 March 1999, <http://www.janes.com/geopol/editors/fr/sample2.html> (1 April 2000). Malaysia's decision to quit FPDA was ostensibly because of economic reasons, but political friction between Singapore and Malaysia is probably equally to blame for the break-up and return. Both politics and budget seem to be playing a role in New Zealand's recent decision to cancel a contract to lease 28 used F-16s from the U.S. This has important implications for FPDA effectiveness as it leaves New Zealand with an aging air fleet of A-4 Skyhawks, the oldest aircraft in the FPDA member nations' air forces.

⁸ Russia is not allocated to USPACOM's AOR under the Unified Command Plan, but USPACOM conducts many military-to-military activities with Russian forces, and Russia is considered for planning in Northeast Asia.

⁹ "South China Sea Region," United States Energy Information Administration, January 2000, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabr/schina.html> (1 May 2000). This document provides a concise

summary of the disputed claims, applicable international law, actions to resolve disputes, and ongoing problems.

¹⁰ Ahmed Rashid and Shiraz Sidhva, "Might and Menace," Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 June 1998, 27-29

¹¹ "Big Powers and Little Sri Lanka," Global Intelligence Update, 5 April 2000, <http://www.stratfor.com/asia/commentary/0005050041.htm> (7 April 2000). This report supplements previous reporting on the LTTE insurgency. India compounded Sri Lanka's tactical problems by reneging on an agreement to help transport Sri Lankan forces located on the Jaffna peninsula.

¹² "USCINCPAC Blue Book," USPACOM Command Information, 10 January 1998, <http://164.213.23.19/j5/j53/strategy/blue/chpt2.htm> (26 April 2000). USCINCPAC's Blue Book contains the USPACOM Theater Engagement Strategy, which has since been modified and adopted as the TEP.

¹³ "United Nations Command," U.S. Forces Korea, <http://www.korea.army.mil/unc.htm> (28 April 2000). UNC's highest strength level was 932,964 on 27 July 1953. The U.S. and South Korea accounted for 893,394 of the total, but U.S. allies (UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Thailand and the Philippines) contributed almost 30,000 soldiers.

¹⁴ "USCINCPAC Blue Book," Appendix F. This appendix lists all CJCS, USPACOM, and major component sponsored exercises, conferences, and other bilateral and multilateral activities.

¹⁵ Ibid. COBRA GOLD is a combination command post and field training exercise that includes all U.S. and Thai services, and is USPACOM's largest exercise. TEAM SPIRIT, formerly USPACOM's largest exercise, was a bilateral exercise with South Korea. TEAM SPIRIT has been held in abeyance because of political considerations with North Korea.

¹⁶ Ibid, Chapter 3, The Elements. USPACOM TEP activities constitute the "elements" of the plan and are grouped according to their place on the conflict spectrum. Preventive defense consists of peacetime operations, crisis response to smaller-scale contingencies is the mid-range category short of major theater war.

¹⁷ Ibid, and "Trinational Gaming for Disaster Relief," Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, Fall 99, January 2000. <http://www.pacom.mil/forum/forum.htm>. (1 May 2000) The Blue Book lists the participants in all activities; the Asia-Pacific Defense Forum article details the first ever Australia-Philippines-U.S. war game based on the 1990 earthquake that hit Baguio, the Philippines. The game focused on the changed security environment since 1990 to determine how the U.S. and Australia might respond to natural disasters in the Philippines now that U.S. bases have been closed, and Philippine, Australian, and U.S. armed forces have reduced in strength. This is the first multilateral HA/DR exercise in USPACOM. Multilateral SAR exercises have been conducted with Russia and Canada participating with USPACOM forces.

¹⁸ "Law and Order at Sea in the South Pacific – Pacific Patrol Boat Project," AUS-CSCAP Newsletter No 8, April 1999, [http://aus-cscap.anu.edu.au/8\(1\).html](http://aus-cscap.anu.edu.au/8(1).html) (19 April 2000). This article is a summation of Australia's Pacific Patrol Boat Project since the project's start in 1979. Australia funds not only the boats, but also the fuel, spare parts, training, and even second Australian personnel to some of the nations to help oversee the program in-country. The program has provided a total of 22 boats to 12 nations for a total cost of A\$249 million. The U.S. supplements the program by providing radios to establish an information network to track ship movement through the area.

¹⁹ Naval War College, Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) (JMO Department, Naval War College 4111C) (Newport, RI: September 1998), 2-1.

²⁰ "Special Reports on Taiwan's Sept. 21 Earthquake," Taiwan Headlines Special Reports, January 2000, <http://www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/921.htm> (1 May 2000). This site contains listings of all pertinent media reports on the 21 September 1999 earthquake in Taiwan. Seven hundred rescue experts from 21 countries converged on Taiwan to provide assistance. Japan provided the largest contingent; the U.S. the second largest. Taiwan did not have the means necessary to coordinate the activities of all the teams and there were many reports that teams were not used effectively for lack of a capable central disaster relief organization.

²¹ "BICC Surplus News and Events: August '99," Bonn International Center for Conversion of Military Resources for Civilian Purposes, August 1999, <http://www.bicc.de/weapons/news/1999/aug99.html> (1 May 2000). In addition to the relief from the U.S. agreement to buy a squadron of F-18s, Thailand also cut its purchase of German AlphaJets for close support from 50 to 25 because of its economic problems. Thailand was also given additional IMET funds to keep Thai military students in U.S. military schools.

²² "USCINCPAC Blue Book," Appendix F.

²³ "Chakri Naruebet," Naval Technology Current Projects, April 2000, <http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/chakrinaruebet>. (3 May 2000). Now that Thailand's economy seems to be improving, Thailand may be considering buying a second carrier to use in the Andaman Sea.

²⁴ "ASEAN and the Management of Regional Security," Asia Pacific Media Network, June 1998, <http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/Deadline/AsianRegionalSecurity/articles/Narine.htm>. (5 May 2000). This article puts ASEAN security relations in true perspective. The Cold War spurred ASEAN's formation and the adoption of ZOPFAN as a means of insulating Southeast Asian nations from the conflict in Vietnam and superpower competition in the region. Now that the Cold War is over, the ASEAN Regional Forum has been formed to try to keep the U.S. and other Asian regional powers like Japan and China engaged in the region, but on ASEAN's terms.

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